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I. INTRODUCTION
Secure detention1 of accused children prior to a finding of guilt
represents one of the most serious and controversial practices in juve-
1. "Detention" is "[tjhe temporary holding of a juvenile pending adjudication for
specific delinquent or status offenses; or for conditions such as dependency, neglect, or
abuse. A juvenile who has already been adjudicated and is awaiting disposition or a transfer
to a placement facility is also detained." JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (Dept. of Jus-
tice/Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), Oct. 1988 at 7-8.
A "secure detention" facility is one "which is designed and operated to ensure that
all entrances and exits from such facility are under exclusive control of the staff of such
facility . . . or which relies on locked rooms and buildings, fences, or physical restraints in
order to control the behavior of its residents." W. VA. CODE § 49-5B-3(7) (1986).
1
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nile justice administration.2 The basic philosophy underlying the
American juvenile justice system is that children are different from
adults-physically, mentally, emotionally, and intellectually-and
should be treated differently.3 Children are viewed as naive and im-
pressionable and in need of special nurturance and understanding.4
However, despite this perception of immaturity and innocence, and a
preference for a more -benign and benevolent treatment of children, the
practice of incarcerating accused youths in jails and jail-like facilities
persists.5 Despite the controversy, the United States Supreme Court
has held preventive pretrial detention of juveniles constitutional6 and
2. For an in-depth discussion of this controversy see ROSEMARY C. SARRI, UNDER
LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION (1974); see also ALBERT R. ROBERTS,
JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES (1989); COMMUNITY RESEARCH
FORUM, PROHIBITING SECURE JUVENILE DETENTION: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NA-
TIONAL STANDARDS DETENTION CRITERIA (1980) [hereinafter PROHIBITING SECURE DETEN-
TION].
3. This view led to the creation of a separate court system for juvenile offenders in
Cook County, Illinois in 1899, marking the beginning of the juvenile justice system of
today. See generally GENNARO F. Vrro & DEBORAH G. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1985). The juvenile court system was envisioned as protective rather than
punitive, and juvenile court proceedings were considered civil proceedings rather than crimi-
nal trials. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM § 1.2.
4. GITo & WILSON, supra note 3, at 16.
5. Each year in the United States approximately 500,000 youths are detained in se-
cure preadjudicatory detention facilities. ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 144. In addition to the
youths held in secure juvenile detention facilities, it is estimated that another 500,000 are
confined in adult jails nationwide. SARRI, supra note 2, at 64.
6. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York
statute authorizing preventive pretrial detention of accused juveniles following a finding of
probable cause to detain. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The relevant language of
the statute at issue states:
The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and reasons
for so finding that unless the respondent is detained: (a) there is a substantial
probability that he will not appear in court on the return date; or (b) there is a
serious risk that he may before the return date commit an act which if committed
by an adult would constitute a crime.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5 (McKinney 1982).
Preventive detention is "the confinement of an accused person prior to trial based
upon a prediction that the person would pose a danger to himself or others if released
pending trial" (emphasis added). James W. Brown et al, PREVENTIVE DETENTION AFrER
SCHALL v MARn 2 (Juvenile Justice Project of the Criminal Justice Section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, Practice Paper No. 2, 1985). In upholding the New York statute, the
Supreme Court concluded that the requirement of a prompt probable cause hearing, the right
506
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such detention remains a relatively common occurrence. Paradoxically,
studies indicate that more children are confined before they have been
adjudged guilty or delinquent than are incarcerated after a finding of
guilt.
7
Detention can have a significant and traumatic impact on a child.
Being coercively removed from the home and family unit and confined
in an institutional setting deprives the accused child of his freedom
and skews the child's perception of justice and may have other over-
whelmingly negative physical, psychological and legal consequences as
well.9 For these reasons, critics question the practice of locking up
to counsel at the detention hearing, and the strictly limited time (seventeen day maximum)
a child could be held in preadjudicatory detention provided sufficient procedural safeguards
for accused youths. Id. at 8, 9. Pretrial detention under Schall presumes an environment
where due process protections are in place and where conditions of confinement meet a
fairly high standard. L. at 11.
7. In 1986, one study revealed that 81% of admissions to juvenile facilities nation-
wide were for detention purposes while only 18% were for formal commitments (1% were
voluntary commitments). JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (Dept. of Justice/Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention), Oct. 1988 at 2. In 1987, 98% of juveniles detained for
juvenile offenses were held in institutional settings. Once adjudicated, only 79% were com-
mitted to institutional settings. Id. at 4.
"[S]tatistics introduced in the district court in Schall indicated that 70% of those de-
tained prior to trial were either acquitted, had their cases dismissed prior to trial, or were
released after trial, even if they were ultimately convicted." Id at 4. Of 409,218 juveniles
in pretrial detention in 1965, only 242,275 were either incarcerated after disposition or
placed on probation. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS: THE RE-
LEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION OF ACCUSED JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST
AND DISPOSITION 2 n.5 (1980) [hereinafter INTERIM STATUS STANDARDS]; see also Elyce Z.
Ferster et al., Juvenile Detention: Protection, Prevention, or Punishment?, 38 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 161 (1969) (survey of jurisdictions revealed that only a small percentage of youths
detained before adjudication were ultimately removed from the community following disposi-
tion: Massachusetts, 25.9 percent; Illinois, 22 percent; Ohio, 19.5 percent; and Texas, 9.7
percent).
8. Sarri, supra note 2, at 14.
9. Assaults, murders, rapes, and suicides have been reported, although these appear to
be more prevalent when juveniles are housed in adult jails. See, e.g., PAUL MONES, Too
Many Rights or Not Enough? A Study of the Juvenile Related Decisions of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 393, 395 (1984) (juvenile beaten to death by adult prison-
er while confined to Wood County, West Virginia, Correctional Facility in 1982); When
Children Go to Jail, NEWsWEEK, May 27, 1985, at 87 (describing horror stories of rapes
and murders of juveniles held in adult jails.)
1992-931
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accused juveniles and suggest that detention be limited to only the
most compelling cases."0
Generally, the goals of preadjudicatory detention are threefold: (1)
To protect the child; (2) to protect society; and (3) to ensure the pres-
ence of the child at future court proceedings.' Some commentators
maintain, however, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to subjectively
predict which juveniles need protection, pose a risk to society, or are
likely to abscond before trial." When the governing standards permit
broad discretion to detain, the potential exists for different
decision-makers to reach vastly different conclusions occasioned by
personal perceptions, biases, and attitudes.1 3 Because of the potential
hazards inherent in secure detention, as well as the imprecise predict-
ability involved, experts suggest that, to justify detention, authorities
need objective, definitive criteria. 4
Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Facili-
ties Review Panel v. Coe15 addressed the need for such objective
Research indicates that a child's self-esteem may be destroyed when subjected to the
harshness of secure detention practices, both in jails and in special juvenile detention facili-
ties. PROHIBITING SECURE DETENTION, supra note 2 at 1, (citing FETROW & FETROW, How
A Pretrial Facility Can Destroy the Self-Esteem of the Juvenile, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 18 (1974), 227-32). Also, deten-
tion with other delinquents may "intensif[y] [the youth's] hostility toward society." Id at 1
(quoting S. NORMAN, THINK TWICE BEFORE You BUILD OR ENLARGE A DETENTION CEN-
TER, New York National Council on Crime and Delinquency).
Additionally, secure confinement may have adverse legal affects by limiting the
juveniles ability to participate in preparing an effective defense, and may even predispose
the youth to harsher dispositional treatment. State ex rel M.C.H. v. Kinder, 317 S.E.2d 150,
156 n.15 (W. Va. 1984). See also ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 155; INTERIM STATUS STAN-
DARDS, supra note 7, at 2, n.4.
10. FRANCIS B. MCCARTHY & JAMES G. CARR, JUVENILE LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
328 (1980); see also ROBERTS, supra note 2; SARRI, supra note 2.
11. ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 149; GITO & WILSON, supra note 3, at 68. Other
justifications cited for detention include: uncooperative parents, adverse home conditions with
no responsible parent willing to assume supervision and control of the child, or a child who
is not amenable to parental control. Id
12. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 150.
13. See generally SARRI, supra note 2; PROHIBITING SECURE DETENTIOn, supra note 2.
14. ROBERTS, supra note 2; see also PROHIBITING SECURE DETENTION, supra note 2,
at 2.
15. 420 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1992).
508 [Vol. 95:505
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preadjudicatory detention standards. Alleging inappropriate and incon-
sistent utilization of secure detention and overcrowding of certain fa-
cilities, the Facilities Review Panel (Panel)16 petitioned the court to
adopt objective criteria to insure uniformity and consistency in the
decision making process and prevent overuse of secure commitment.
17
Additionally, the Panel requested mandatory rotation of judges hearing
juvenile cases as a further means of assuring appropriate utilization of
detention centers. 8
Ultimately, the court adopted objective detention standards as
proposed by the Panel, as well as procedural protective measures to
prevent overcrowding.' 9 The court reasoned that these standards are
consistent with existing West Virginia law and reflect the legislative
and judicial preference for release over detention.2" Further, the court
determined that, with adherence to the standards and guidelines set
forth, rotation of judges would be unnecessary.2
The Facilities Review decision significantly alters the detention
process in the West Virginia counties where children are regularly
detained. This Comment discusses the court's decision in Facilities
Review to enable the reader to understand the new standards and their
implications for the administration of juvenile justice in West Virginia.
II. STANDARDIZATION ATTEMPTS: EFFORTS AT
REFORMING THE PROCESS
The problem of preadjudicatory detention is characterized by the
large number of youths detained, the harshly restrictive and often over-
16. The Facilities Review Panel, also called the Juvenile Justice Committee, is a statu-
torily created body, part of whose responsibilities include visiting, inspecting, and document-
ing conditions in juvenile institutions. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16b (1986). At the time of this
action, the members of the committee were Jay M. Brown, Franklin D. Cleckley, Daniel F.
Hedges, Bradley Pyles, and Gregory Wagner. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d
532, 532 (W. Va. 1992).
17. Id. at 533 n.2.
18. Id.
19. l at 535-36.
20. Id. at 535.
21. l
1992-93]
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crowded conditions of confinement, the high costs of detention, and
the potential for detrimental after-effects.' These difficulties are com-
pounded by the use of overly broad and discretionary guidelines in
making the decision to detain or release.3 As a basis for reform in
this area, various organizations and some jurisdictions have made ef-
forts to more stringently limit the circumstances under which detention
would be appropriate through the development of strict objective crite-
ria.
A. Efforts to Create a Uniform Framework
In 1973, in response to critics' assertions of a need for reform and
uniformity in the juvenile justice process, the Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project (Project) began.' The Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion (IJA) 5 and the American Bar Association (ABA) combined ef-
forts to develop a series of standards which could serve as a paradigm
for courts, legislatures, and others seeking consistency in juvenile jus-
tice administration.26 Among the models promulgated were standards
specific to pretrial detention.27 These 9tandards demonstrate a strong
preference for mandatory release or non-secure placement except in
specifically identifiable circumstances. These criteria limit permissible
detention to specific types of offenses and demonstrated behaviors.28
22. INTERIM STATUS STANDARDS, supra note 7, Introduction at 1.
23. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
24. INTERIM STATUS STANDARDSsupra note 7, Preface at v.
25. IJA is a private nonprofit research and educational organization located at New
York University School of Law. Id at v-vi.
26. The Project culminated in the publication of twenty-three volumes collectively
called "Juvenile Justice Standards." Seventeen of these volumes were approved and adopted
by the ABA House of Delegates in 1979. Id at vii.
27. Id, § 6.6. at 78.
28. These guidelines provide for the mandatory release of the accused juvenile unless
the juvenile:
1. is charged with a crime of violence which in the case of an adult would be
punishable by a sentence of one year or more, and which if proven is likely to
result in a commitment to a security institution, and one or more of the following
additional factors is present:
a. the crime charged is a class one juvenile offense;
b. the juvenile is an escapee from an institution or other placement facility
to which he or she was sentenced under a previous adjudication or criminal con-
[Vol. 95:505
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The Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, the supervising
body for the Project, viewed these standards as a proper balance be-
tween the interests of the child and the community's need for safe-
ty.
29
Similarly, with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act of 1974,30 Congress encouraged the development of objective
standards for the overall administration of juvenile justice nationwide.
Two of the major goals of the Act were to reduce the use of secure
detention and to provide alternatives to the use of secure detention.31
However, as the disparity among and within states in the number of
juveniles detained reflects, the uniformity Congress envisioned has yet
to be achieved.32
duct;
C. the juvenile has a demonstrable recent record of wilful failure to appear
at juvenile proceedings, on the basis of which the official finds that no measure
short of detention can be imposed to reasonably ensure appearance; or
2. has been verified to be a fugitive from another jurisdiction, an official of
whom has formally requested that the juvenile be placed in detention.
Id The guidelines further encourage release despite paragraph one. The relevant language of
the standard states: "A juvenile who is excluded from mandatory release ... is not, pro
tanto, to be automatically detained. No category of alleged conduct in and of itself may
justify a failure to exercise discretion to release." l
29. Id, Commentary at 79.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5606 (1988).
31. Id
32. A 1975 study of detentions affirmed the disparity in the use of detention among
states: For a one year period, California detained 139,423 juveniles; Florida, Washington,
Texas, and Ohio each detained approximately 20,000 juveniles. These five states accounted
for one-half of all detentions nationwide although the number of juveniles living in these
states comprised less than one-fifth of the national juvenile population. When ranked by the
number of detentions per 100,000 youthful population within the states, the distribution
ranged from a low of zero per 100,000 to 4,500 per 100,000. These statistics did not in-
clude juveniles housed in adult jails. JOHN E. PoUuN ET AL., REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL
JUVENILE JUSTICE ASSESSMENT CENTERS: JUVENILES IN DETENTION CENTERS AND JAILS 5
(1980).
A 1977 study of detention in New Jersey revealed that in one rural county the
detention rate was five times higher than that of another nearby rural county. This disparity
existed even though both counties were operating under the same state statute. Pennsylvania
statistics revealed a similar intrastate inconsistency. PREVENTING SECURE DETENTION, supra
note 2, at 2.
7
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In 1976, also acting on the premise that pretrial detention practices
were largely inappropriate and overly discretionary, the National Advi-
sory Committee on Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
formulated a model of objective criteria to guide the decision-making
process.33 Permissible situations for detention proposed by this com-
mittee paralleled those of the IJA/ABA Project, with criteria designed
to place less reliance on the judge's subjective judgment by providing
specifically identifiable instances in which detention would be appro-
priate. 34
B. Local Jurisdictional Efforts: Impressive Results
Concerned with the issue of appropriateness and potential overuse
of secure detention, some states and local jurisdictions have moved
from broad general guidelines to more measurable and verifiable crite-
ria.3 ' Although no studies were found addressing the effectiveness of
these objective standards on any statewide basis, studies in local juris-
dictions indicate that, overall, such standards have resulted in fewer
detentions and less overcrowding of facilities in those jurisdictions
while not adversely affecting public safety or court integrity. For illus-
tration, two of the projects will be discussed.
In Colorado, the Division of Youth Services (DYS) developed a
proposal to address the issues of overcrowding of its juvenile detention
facilities and inappropriate use of secure detention.36 The proposal
was intended to reduce the number of inappropriate detentions through
the use of intake screening units and various non-secure detention
alternatives as well as using formalized written criteria37 as a basis
for determining the need for and appropriateness of detention.3' The
33. Id
34. Id
35. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.601 (1989);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248.1 (Michie 1988).
36. COMMUNrIY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIV. OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, THE
ARAPAHOE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM (1984).
37. The criteria clearly identified those for whom detention was mandatory and those
for whom detention was not appropriate, yet maintained judicial discretion in a third group.
Id at 3, 4, 5.
38. 1& at 1.
[Vol. 95:505
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/9
JUVENILE DETENTION
goal of the program was to promote appropriate use of secure deten-
tion and reduce the number of youths detained without creating new
dangers to the community or disrupting the court process. 9
In a pilot project, DYS introduced the program at the Arapahoe
Youth Center in Arapahoe County. This secure facility had a capacity
for fifteen youths, but was continually overcrowded. This overcrowding
resulted in the facility having to transfer juveniles to accommodate
twenty or more youths per day.' After implementation of the project,
the average daily detention population and the average length of stay
for juveniles were reduced significantly. The average daily population
was reduced from eighteen to eleven detainees4' while the average
length of stay was decreased from seven days to five.42 Furthermore,
no increase in the rate of recidivism or failure to appear in court oc-
curred.4 3 Additionally, the project resulted in a thirty-eight percent
reduction in the amount of money expended to hold juveniles in secure
detention." Clearly, these statistics demonstrate the effectiveness of
objective measures for determining the appropriateness of secure deten-
tion and the use of less restrictive alternatives. Moreover, these statis-
tics demonstrate an absence of any adverse impact on the community
or the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Similar results were achieved in Jefferson County, Kentucky, when
strict objective criteria very much like those promulgated by the
IJA/ABA project were utilized as the determinative standards for de-
39. Id at 2, 3.
40. Id. at 1.
41. lt at 13.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Before implementation of the project, the recidivism rate was 12.3% within three
months and 16.6% within six months after referral to the center. After implementation, the
three month rate was 9.4% and the six month rate had decreased to 13.8%. The failure to
appear in court rate before implementation was 31% within the first three months after
referral. This figure after implementation was 27.6%. IaL at 12.
44. In 1980, the average daily cost for holding a youth in secure detention was
$56.97, while non-secure detention costs averaged $14.75. For the twelve months preceding
the program, the State of Colorado spent $374,293 to detain an average daily population of
18 at the Arapahoe Center. With an average daily population of 11 after initiation of the
program, this cost was reduced to $232,893 for the twelve months following implementation.
Ia at 12, 13.
1992-93]
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tention.45 Studies in that jurisdiction revealed a fifty-six percent re-
duction in the detention rate without a significant change in the rate at
which these juveniles were rearrested after release and only a marginal
increase in the failure to appear rate." This slight increase in the
number of youths failing to show up for later court appearances was
felt to be controllable with an increased use of monitored home deten-
tion programs such as electronic monitoring.47
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background
Facilities Review initially came before the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1989 on a petition for a writ of mandamus
brought by the Panel and Taunja Willis-Miller, the Secretary of the
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources
(DHHR),48 alleging overuse of secure detention in Wood County,
West Virginia, and inconsistency in detention practices statewide.
49
The petitioners contended that assignment of Wood County juvenile
45. COMMUNITY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN,
A COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO CRISIS: THE EFFECIVE USE OF DETENTION AND ALTERNA-
TIVES TO DETENTION IN JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY (1983).
46. In Mar. 1979, before the standards were in use, 205 youths were held in excess
of twelve hours; in Sept. 1979, after implementation, a total of 89 youths were detained for
more than twelve hours. Even though less than half as many youths were detained using
the objective criteria, the total rearrest rate increased only 0.4% (from 9.6% before to 10%
after), and the rearrest rate for felony charges actually fell by 0.8% (from 4.7% before to
3.9% after). Likewise, the program saw only a 4% increase in the rate of youths failing to
appear in court (an increase from 4.7% before use of the criteria to 8.7% after implementa-
tion). Id at 4, 5, 6.
47. Id. at 6.
48. The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), formerly the Depart-
ment of Human Services, has the responsibility for licensing all juvenile detention facilities
in West Virginia, and is charged with providing for the "care . . . for children needing
detention pending disposition by a court . . . or temporary care following [ ] court action."
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16b (1986). Of the six detention facilities in the state, four are direct-
ly operated and funded by the DHHR. Petitioners' Note of Argument at 2, Facilities Review
Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1992) (No. 19123).
49. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 3-7, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d
532 (W. Va. 1992) (No. 19123).
514
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cases to only one judge, Respondent Judge Arthur Gustke of West
Virginia's Fourth Judicial Circuit, resulted in excessive commitment of
accused youths to preadjudicatory detention, creating serious over-
crowding of the West Central Regional Juvenile Detention Center
(WCRJDC) in Wood County.50 The overcrowding of the WCRJDC
created a dilemma for the DHHR, in that the dangers of overcrowding
could subject the DHHR to liability, yet refusing to accept youths into
the facility following court ordered commitment could place the agency
in the position of being in contempt of court.5' To alleviate this con-
dition, the petitioners asked the court to order mandatory rotation of
judges by the Respondent Circuit Clerk, Juanita Coe, among the three
circuit judges presiding in Wood County.52 They also asked the court
to require that circuit courts develop and utilize less restrictive alter-
natives to secure detention.53
The petitioners requested that the court adopt the juvenile deten-
tion criteria developed by the IJA/ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Pro-
ject. 4 The petitioners asserted that the lack of standardized guidelines
50. WCRJDC, a secure regional detention facility licensed and operated by DHHR, is
licensed to house a maximum of ten children from several counties. At the time of this
petition, the facility often housed twenty or more children. The average daily population
from Jan. to May 1989 was approximately fifty percent over capacity. Petitioners' Note of
Argument at 2-6, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1992) (No.
19123). Because of overcrowding, children often had to sleep on floors and were confined
in unhealthy living environments. Report of Special Master at 18, Facilities Review Panel v.
Coe, 420 S.E.2d. 352 (W. Va. 1992) (No. 19123). The court noted that another reason for
the overcrowding was a delay in scheduling of juvenile court hearings which led to pro-
longed stays of detainees. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, No. 19123, slip op. at 3 n.1 (W.
Va. Nov. 17, 1989) (interim order appointing special master to investigate the need for
standardized juvenile detention guidelines and to make a statewide review of juvenile deten-
tion centers).
51. Id at 4.
52. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 16, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d
532 (W. Va. 1992) (No. 19123).
53. Id at 15. The petitioners asked the court to require the Respondent Judge Gustke
to cooperate with the DHHR in establishing guidelines for an in-home detention program, to
utilize electronic monitoring equipment in lieu of secure detention, and to refrain from com-
mitting additional children to the WCRJDC when the maximum capacity of ten children had
been reached. Id
54. Id Specifically, the petitioners sought to have the court adopt § 6.6 of the IN-
TERIM STATUS STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 78. Id
11
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in West Virginia results in arbitrary and inconsistent use of pretrial
detention.' They posited that standardization of criteria would reduce
the use and misuse of detention by requiring all circuit judges to base
their decisions on the same objective factors.56
55. According to the statistics for Aug. 1, 1988 through Jan. 31, 1989 submitted by
the petitioners, the detention rate among counties varied considerably. For example, Wood
County accounted for one fourth of all detainees statewide. The Wood County detention rate
was 12.273 detentions per 1,000 juvenile cases compared with a rate of 7.204 per 1,000 in
Cabell County, and only 4.292 per 1,000 for Kanawha County. Eight counties had a zero
detention rate, and eighteen counties detained less than one juvenile per 1,000 cases. The
raw data for all fifty-five counties is tabulated below:
Total Rate
Commit- per
County ments 1030
Wood 175 12.273
Cabell 108 7.204
Roane 13 5.939
Kanawha 131 4.292
Summers 6 3.440
Marshall 18 2.975
Braxton 1 2.962
Berkeley 23 2.843
Ohio 24 2.833
Pendleton 3 2.745
Jackson 11 2.634
Mercer 29 2.634
Wit 2 2.506
Fayette 22 2.325
Marion 18 1.808
Jefferson 10 1.727
Nicholas 8 1.633
Wayne 12 1.577
Calhoun 2 1.534
Petitioner's Note of Argument
Total Rate
Commit- per
ounty ments 1000
Greenbrier 9 1.503
Upshur 6 1.450
Harrison 15 1.356
Webster 3 1.347
Clay 3 1.310
Boone 7 1.291
Mason 5 1.213
Ritchie 2 1.199
Raleigh 15 1.113
Putnam 7 1.047
Mingo 7 0.992
Brooke 4 0.869
Doddridge 1 0.760
Lewis 2 0.695
Hampshire 2 0.694
Hancock 4 0.682
Pocahontas 1 0.673
Morgan 1 0.668
Hardy 1 0.663
Total Rate
Commit- per
County ments 1000
Lincoln 2 0.518
Preston 2 0.397
Barbour 1 0.361
McDowell 3 0.338
Wetzel 1 0.264
Monongalia 3 0.258
Logan 2 0.230
Mineral 1 0.210
Wyoming 1 0.154
Gilmer 0 0
Grant 0 0
Monroe 0 0
Pleasants 0 0
Randolph 0 0
Taylor 0 0
Tyler 0 0
Tucker 0 0
at 3, Facilities Review Panel v. Co, 420 S.E.2d 536 (W.
Va. 1992) (No. 19123) (based on the period Aug. 1, 1988 to Jan. 31, 1989; the rate col-
umn reflects the number of commitments to secure detention per 1,000 youthful population)
(quoting JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ASPECTS OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN WEST VIR-
GINIA COUNTIES: PETITIONS, SECURE DETENTION, AND DETENTION RATE 5 (1989)).
56. See id at 15, 36
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Despite the petitioners' "enlightening" arguments, the court de-
clined to "overhaul" the system without further investigation and un-
derstanding of the problem.57 Therefore, the court delayed ruling on
the petition pending an in-depth review. To this end, the court appoint-
ed as Special Master Judge Larry Starcher, Chief Judge of the Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit, to study and report to the court the actual ex-
tent of the problems in juvenile detention practices in West Virginia,
and the need for standardized detention guidelines for effectuating a
resolution to such problems.5" In performing his investigation, the
court asked Judge Starcher to review the situation at WCRJDC and
other detention centers, to examine relevant statistics and practices
statewide and to report on the current state of the law in West Virgin-
ia. The court further requested that he investigate the dangers of over-
crowding in detention facilities and the resulting effects of overcrowd-
ing on the services normally offered to detainees. Additionally, the
court directed Judge Starcher to investigate the need for case rotation
within the circuits.59
B. Report of the Special Master
The Special Master's Report (Report) was submitted to the court
on September 4, 1990. The report first presented an overview of the
law in West Virginia. This overview showed that certain regulations
and requirements did exist in the state sufficient to constitute "deten-
tion criteria" to guide the decision-making process.60 The report fur-
ther emphasized the legislative and judicial preference for release of
accused juveniles.61
57. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, No. 19123 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 1989) (interim order
appointing special master to investigate the need for standardized juvenile detention guide-
lines and to make a statewide review of juvenile detention centers).
58. Id at 7.
59. Id
60. Report of Special Master at 4-9, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532
(W. Va. 1992) (No. 19123).
61. Id
1992-931 517
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Secondly, the report presented a statistical analysis of detention
practices in 'West Virginia. The findings set forth by the Special Mas-
ter demonstrated support for the petitioners' assertions of inconsistency
in detention practices.62  Similarly, the report documented
over-commitnent to certain detention centers beyond their licensed
maximum capacities.63 The Special Master attributed part of the over-
crowding problem to delays in the dispositional process following
adjudication, citing the absence in the current law of time limits be-
yond the adjudicatory stage as sanctioning lengthy stays in detention
centers between trial and disposition or placement." The report also
62. For example, from Aug. 1, 1988 to July 31, 1989, Wood County had a commit-
ment rate of 22.947 per 1,000 youths by population. For the same period, Cabell County
detained 15.085 per 1,000 youths by population, while Kanawha County detained only
10.043 per 1,000. Id at 16. Furthermore, the charges on which youths were detained was
reported to vary greatly throughout the state, from less serious misdemeanors to capital felo-
nies. Additionally, since the facilities are not all operated by the same agency, there was no
uniform reporting system and no standardized contingency plans to deal with overcrowding.
Id at 17.
63. The Report gave the following figures:
Licensed Average Daily
Facility by Location Capacity Population
Dunbar 17 16
Martinsburg 10 6
Ona 5 not reported
Parkersburg 10 12
Princeton 15 11
Wheeling 14 9
Id at 11. The Parkerrsburg facility is the WCRJDC whose overcrowding was the impetus
for this case. In 1989, the daily population of this facility exceeded its maximum capacity
on 232 days. In comparison, the Princeton facility was beyond maximum capacity on 16
days; Wheeling, 3 days; and Dunbar and Martinsburg were not over their maximum capaci-
ty at any time during the year (data for Ona facility was not reported). Id. at 12. Although
the Parkersburg WVRJDC legally has space only for 6 youths, it was given a waiver in
1987 to expand the capacity to the licensed capacity of 10. Id at 11.
64. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 95:505
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presented for the court some of the problems and dangers created by
overcrowding of detention facilities.'
Professionals interviewed in the Special Master's investigation
differed on the appropriate solution to the detention problems. Howev-
er, the majority of persons surveyed felt that "there should be more of
an emphasis on releasing versus detaining at the detention hearing"'
and that it would "be better to inappropriately release than inappropri-
ately detain a youth."67
As solutions to the problems of inconsistency and overcrowding,
the Special Master propounded two options. The first suggested that
the current state of the law need not be altered, but that existing li-
censing standards should be enforced to avoid overcrowding.6" To this
end, the report proposed requiring verification of available space before
ordering or transporting a youth to a facility, extending to facility
personnel the authority to refuse to accept any youth beyond capacity,
implementing reporting procedures and developing and utilizing less
restrictive alternatives to detention.69 The second option recommended
that the court adopt objective detention standards such as those pro-
posed by the petitioners, along with the protective measures contained
in option one to deal with overcrowding. 70 The Special Master con-
cluded that mandatory rotation of judges would be unnecessary with
the adherence to the standards set forth in either option.71
IV. PRIOR LAW
Preadjudicatory detention in West Virginia is governed by both
statutory and case law. Chapter 49 of the West Virginia Code and
65. As problems encountered when facilities are overcrowded, the Report listed the
following: Lack of bed space, less activities and services per child, less counseling and
supervision, an unhealthy living environment, increased stress and tension, morale problems,
disciplinary problems, lack of privacy for inmates, safety factors, and others. Id at 18.
66. Id at 21.
67. Id
68. Id at 22, 23.
69. Id
70. Id at 23, 24.
71. Id at 27.
1992-931 519
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State ex rel. MC.H. v. Kinder72 provide the requirements and limita-
tions that constitute the framework of the detention guidelines in West
Virginia. Although detention is permissible, the existing law reflects a
legislative and judicial preference for release rather than detention
pending an adjudication of guilt. However, the language of these gov-
erning standards is rather vague, and, as demonstrated by the statistics
submitted in the Special Master's report, permits inconsistent interpre-
tation and discretionary application.73 The following provides an over-
view of the state of the law in West Virginia prior to the court's
decision in Facilities Review.
A. Statutory Provisions
West Virginia statutes provide the core of the existing law govern-
ing the detention of children in West Virginia. A "child," for purposes
of juvenile court jurisdiction and for whom the statutory provisions
apply, means any person under eighteen years of age or any person
subject to the juvenile jurisdiction of a court.74 A child sixteen years
of age or older, who commits an offense that would be a crime if
committed by an adult, and who is adjudged delinquent for the act,
continues under the juvenile court's jurisdiction until he or she reaches
age twenty.75 Therefore, youths aged eighteen to twenty may remain
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts and may be held in juve-
nile detention facilities.
The purpose of the legislation embodied in Chapter 49 of the
West Virginia Code is "to provide a comprehensive system of child
welfare throughout the State which will assure to each child such care
and guidance, preferably in his or her home, and will serve the spiri-
tual, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child., 76 In further
manifesting a preference for release rather than detention of children,
the code states that "it is the intention of the legislature to provide for
72. 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1984).
73. See supra note 62.
74. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2 (1986).
75. 1l
76. W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (1986) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 95:505
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removing the child from the custody of parents only when the child's
welfare or the safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately
safeguarded without removal." It also establishes that, at the deten-
tion hearing, "[t]he Court shall, if advisable, and if the health, safety
and welfare of the child will not be endangered thereby, release the
child on recognizance to his parents, custodians or the appropriate
agency."t7
After a youth is arrested or taken into custody, the juvenile justice
process generally takes place in five stages: a detention hearing, at
which the decision to detain or release is made; a preliminary hearing
for the purpose of determining probable cause; an adjudicatory hearing
analogous to a trial in an adult court setting, at which time guilt or
innocence is determined (however, a juvenile is deemed to have been
"adjudicated delinquent" rather than found guilty); a dispositional hear-
ing, at which sentencing takes place; and placement or implementation
of the sentence.79 During the intervening times, authorities may hold
a child in detention. In West Virginia, the legislature has set limits on
the permissible length of time a child 'may remain in custody while
awaiting a detention, preliminary, or adjudicatory hearing. When a
child is arrested or taken into custody, the code mandates that he
receive a prompt hearing for the purpose of determining the need for
detention. The youth must be taken immediately before a judge or
referee, and "shall be forthwith afforded a hearing to ascertain if such
child shall be further detained."' A hearing must be held before a
judge, magistrate, or juvenile referee "without delay, ' ' "1 and any delay
must not exceed the next judicial day.' Unless waived by the juve-
nile on advice of counsel, a preliminary hearing must be held within
ten days of the time a child is taken into custody, and if not, the court
must release the child on recognizance (a hearing may be continued,
however, for good cause).8 3 If the child is further detained, the court
77. d
78. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(d) (1986) (emphasis added).
79. See generally Grro & WILSON, supra note 3.
80. W. VA CODE § 49-5A-2 (1986).
81. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(a) (1986).
82. Id.
83. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-9(a) (1986).
1992-931
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must commence an adjudicatory hearing within thirty days, or if a jury
trial is demanded, this hearing must begin no later than the next regu-
lar term of the court." Thus, authorities may legally hold a child in
secure detention for up to forty days before the child has even been
found to have committed the act charged or been adjudged delinquent.
However, the code provides no limitations on the length of time a
juvenile may remain in detention following adjudication while awaiting
disposition or placement.
The code provides that, at the detention hearing, "[u]nless the
circumstances of the case otherwise require taking into account the
welfare of the child as well as the interest of society, such child shall
be released forthwith into the custody of his parent or parents, relative,
custodian, or other responsible adult or agency."8 5 The code also per-
mits release on bail in appropriate situations.8 6 Furthermore, the child
is entitled to legal representation at the detention hearing and at every
stage of the juvenile proceedings against him.'
In addition to urging prompt release of children, the code places
limitations and restrictions on where and with whom courts may order
juveniles detained. Juveniles charged with status offenses" such as
truancy or incorrigibility may not be detained in a detention or other
facility with persons detained for criminal offenses or for delinquency
involving behavior that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult.8 9 When detention is deemed necessary, under West Virginia
law, the judge or referee must avoid the incarceration of a child under
eighteen in any jail.' Nevertheless, a child over fourteen years of age
whom the court has committed to an industrial home or correctional
institution may remain in a juvenile department of an adult jail while
84. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-9(d) (1986).
85. W. VA. CODE § 49-5A-2 (1986).
86. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(d) (1986).
87. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1(c) (1986).
88. A "status offender" is a "juvenile who has been charged with delinquency or
adjudicated a delinquent for conduct which would not be a crime if committed by an
adult." W. VA. CODE § 49-5B-3(3) (1986).
89. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(a) (1986).
90. W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-16(a) & 49-5A-2 (1986).
[Vol. 95:505
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awaiting transportation to the place of commitment.91 However, the
code restricts this holding period to ninety six hours.9 Additionally, a
court may order a child over fourteen who is charged with a violent
felony crime housed in a juvenile detention portion of a jail.93 How-
ever, he may not be within the sight of adult prisoners.9
B. State ex rel. M.C.H. v. Kinder
In addition to the statutory guidelines discussed above, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals provided further guidance for those
judicial officials considering the appropriateness of detention in State
ex rel. M.C.H. v. Kinder.95 In Kinder, the court reiterated the substan-
tial preference for release established by the legislature. 6 To under-
score the purpose underlying the preference for release, the court noted
the serious costs imposed by secure detention on both society and
juveniles alike:97
Congressional testimony, various studies, and the media have discussed the
negative aspects of secure juvenile detention on both the juvenile and the
public. Studies have concluded that the practice of detaining children
should be severely limited for the following reasons:
-A detention center's environment may serve to promote rather than
discourage future delinquency behavior.
-Secure detention is costly to the taxpayer.
-Detention may hamper the juvenile's opportunity to prepare an effective
defense.
-Detention may subtly influence the court's final disposition of the case
to the juvenile's detriment.98
91. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(a) (1986).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id
95. 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1984).
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id. at 156 n.15.
98. Id. (citing UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report to the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Interior: Improved Efforts needed to Change Juvenile
Detention Practices 2 (1983)).
1992-93] 523
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In Kinder, two juveniles, aged seven and nine, petitioned the court
for writs of prohibition and habeas corpus, challenging their detention
in secure facilities while awaiting disposition of delinquency pro-
ceedings.' Police arrested the children on a delinquency charge of
breaking and entering after apprehending them in a local school with
approximately twelve dollars worth of toys, candy, and money in their
possession."' The magistrate before whom the officers took the chil-
dren ordered both children detained in secure confinement after the
children's mother was unable to post a five thousand dollar bond set
for each child.0° In considering the issues raised, the court held that
"young children should not be placed in secure detention except in the
most extraordinary cases," " and concluded that the bail requirement
in this situation was inappropriate.'0 3 Further, the court declared that
"[c]ommitting officials have a duty to explain in writing their reasons
for detaining a child, their choice of placement, and if they require
secured bail, their reasons for doing so." 14
The court acknowledged that the code contained basic detention
guidelines, but determined that the standards upon which a court was
to base its decision to detain were overly general. Citing the relevant
statutory language comprising this standard-"taking into account the
welfare of the child as well as the interest of society"l°-the court
noted the need for "further refmement."106 Toward this end, the court
listed seven relevant factors to be considered along with the statutory
guidelines in making the decision to detain or release an accused juve-
nile. The factors set forth by the court were:
99. The two juveniles were held in the Kanawha Home for Children in Dunbar, West
Virginia, a secure detention facility housing juvenile offenders charged with a variety of
categories of criminal offenses, including violent crimes and crimes of a sexual nature. Id
at 151-52.
100. Il at 152.
101. The children's mother was a thirty-two year old homemaker supporting herself and
her children on $206 dollars per month in welfare assistance and food stamps. Ida at 151.
102. Id at 157.
103. Id at 158.
104. Id
105. Id at 156 (citing W. VA. CODE § 49-5A-2 (1986)).
106. Id
["Vol. 95:505
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(1) the seriousness of the offense charged;
(2) the likelihood of flight, or conversely stated the probability of his ap-
pearance;
(3) his prior juvenile record and regularity of appearances;
(4) whether under all the circumstances, he poses a substantial danger to
himself or to the community;
(5) his age, maturity, and general health;
(6) his family background and the family's willingness to supervise his
behavior; and
(7) the availability of alternative sources of placement, short of a secure
detention facility, if the family is unavailable, unfit, or unwilling to exer-
cise control over the child."°
The criteria incorporated in the Kinder opinion, along with the
relevant statutory provisions, comprise the juvenile detention criteria as
they existed prior to Facilities Review. The petitioners in Facilities
Review contended these guidelines continued to be subjective and
overly broad and did not provide the level of uniformity necessary to
ensure consistent detention decisions statewide. 08
V. THE OPINION AND MODIFICATION ON REHEARING
On April 25, 1991, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
rendered its opinion in Facilities Review and granted the petitioners'
writ of mandamus. 9 The court adopted the IJA/ABA detention crite-
ria as sought by the petitioners, along with the procedural protective
measures to ensure against overcrowding of facilities as recommended
by the Special Master.' These newly implemented guidelines were
to become effective sixty days after adoption."'
Prior to the effective date for implementation of the new stan-
dards, the Prosecuting Attorney for Kanawha County sought to inter-
107. Id at 157.
108. Petitioners' Note of Argument at 15-16, 36-37, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe,
420 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1992) (No. 19123).
109. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, No. 19123, slip op. (W. Va. Apr. 25, 1991) (un-
published).
110. I at 6-8.
111. Id at 9.
1992-931
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vene on behalf of the State of West Virginia,11 2 and asked for a stay
in the implementation of the decision.1 13 The intervenor further peti-
tioned for a rehearing and modification of the guidelines.1 1 4 The in-
tervenor contended that the new standards, as adopted, did not ade-
quately safeguard the public because the criteria too narrowly restricted
the use of detention to too few crimes, and excluded other types of
criminal activity which were felt to pose equal danger to the communi-
ty.ll5
The court granted the intervenor's motions and petition. After
rehearing and reconsideration of the standards, the court again granted
the petitioners' writ, with implementation to be effective sixty days
after the opinion,"' but with modification of the standards to permit
detention in situations not covered by the IJA/ABA standards.1 17 Un-
der the modified standards, release is mandatory unless the crime
charged, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by a sentence
of one year or more, and which, if proven, could result in commitment
to a security institution.1 Coupled with this requirement must be
one or more of the following factors:
a. The crime charged is a category one juvenile offense." 9
112. Motion to Intervene, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, No. 19123, (W. Va. Apr. 25,
1991).
113. Motion to Stay, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, No. 19123, (V. Va. Apr. 25,
1991).
114. Intervenor's Petition for Rehearing, Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, No. 19123,
slip op. (W. Va. Apr. 25, 1991).
115. According to the Intervenor's petition, unless the accused juvenile was a fugitive
or escapee, detention would be permissible only upon accusations of first degree murder,
aggravated robbery, kidnapping, first degree sexual assault, and treason. Absent from the
permissibly detainable situations were second degree murder, voluntary and involuntary man-
slaughter, assaults, abduction, arson, distribution of drugs, burglaries, and other serious
crimes. Id. at 4-5.
116. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532, 537 (W. Va. 1992). The opinion
was filed as modified on June 11, 1992.
117. See hIA/ABA standards, supra note 28.
118. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532, 537 app. A (V. Va. 1992).
119. Category one juvenile offenses include the following: Treason; murder, first or
second degree, or felony murder, murder of child by parent; kidnapping; sexual assault, first
or second degree; robbery, aggravated or non-aggravated; malicious assault; possession, man-
ufacture, or delivery of controlled substances other than narcotics (except possession of less
22
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b. The crime charged is a category two or four'2 juvenile offense and
there is a judicial finding that the juvenile presents a danger to the public
if not securely detained, pursuant to an immediate full detention hearing in
which the juvenile is represented by an attorney.
c. The crime charged is a category two, three, or four12' juvenile of_
fense and the juvenile is an escapee from detention or any commitment
setting pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1 et seq; or the juvenile has a
recent record of willful failure to appear at juvenile court proceedings and
no measure short of secure detention can be imposed to reasonably ensure
appearance.
d. The crime charged is a violation of an alternative method of sentenc-
ing.
e. The juvenile is waiting adjudication or disposition for an offense
which would be a felony under criminal jurisdiction or a category one,
two, three, or four offense and is charged with committing another offense
during the interim period which would be a felony or a category one, two,
three, or four offense. Another less restrictive means of supervising the
juvenile such as electronic monitoring, home detention or shelter care must
have been tried and failed.
f. The juvenile is awaiting adjudication or disposition for an offense
which would be a felony under criminal jurisdiction or a category one,
two, three, or four offense and is released on bond conditions but is found
by a judicial authority to have committed a material violation of
bond .... Another less restrictive means of supervising the juvenile...
must have been tried and failed.2'2
than 15 grams of marijuana); possession, manufacture, or delivery of narcotics; arson, first
degree; sexual assault of spouse; sexual abuse, first degree; brandishing a deadly weapon;
carrying a concealed deadly weapon; violation of any alternative sentencing;any attempted
category one offense. Id at 539 app. A.1.
120. Category two juvenile offenses include: Child sexual abuse; incest; child abuse,
injurious; child neglect, injurious; burglary; sexual assault, third degree; voluntary man-
slaughter, sexual abuse, second degree; unlawful wounding; any attempted category two
offense. Id app. A.2.
Category four juvenile offenses include: "All other charges of criminal-type delin-
quent behavior which, in the case of an adult would be punishable by a sentence of not
less than one year and if proven, could result in a commitment to a security facility, but is
not herein enumerated . . . ." kd. at 540 app. A.4.
121. Category three juvenile offenses include: DUI causing death; abduction; sexual
procurement, child under sixteen; extortion; DULI, second or third offense or personal injury;
possession or placing of explosives; malicious killing of an animal; arson, second, third, or
fourth degree; unlawful shooting; involuntary manslaughter, negligent vehicular homicide;
battery; hit and run causing personal injury; escape from jail or Department of Corrections;
sexual abuse, third degree; any attempted category three offense. lMi at 539-40 app. A.2.
122. Id at app. A.
1992-931
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Furthermore, a court may detain a juvenile whom the court has
verified as a fugitive from another jurisdiction if an official from the
other jurisdiction formally requests such detention.'23 The court may
also order detention upon finding that the youth poses a danger to
witnesses if released from custody." Additionally, the modified stan-
dards provide that the juvenile authority may condition release upon
bond.' The rules continue to provide some degree of judicial dis-
cretion, even when release is not mandatory. The relevant language of
the standard provides that "[a] juvenile who is excluded from manda-
tory release... is not, pro tanto, to be automatically detained. No
category of alleged conduct in and of itself may justify a failure to
exercise discretion to release in consideration of the needs of the juve-
nile and the community." 126 Furthermore, when release is not manda-
tory, the standards suggest the use of less restrictive means of control
and require written explanations of the reasons for rejecting such alter-
natives. 27
The Facilities Review court established equally important proce-
dural safeguards to protect against overcrowding of detention centers.
Before authorities may transport a juvenile to a detention facility, the
arresting officer or judicial official holding the detention hearing must
ascertain if a vacancy exists at that facility.1" Furthermore, a facility
is now authorized to refuse to accept juveniles beyond their licensed
capacity, and any attempts to force such admissions must be immedi-
ately reported to the DHHR and the Facilities Review Panel.'29 To
further ensure against overcrowding, the court set specific time limita-
tions in which a juvenile may remain in detention. The maximum time
a juvenile may now be held in detention while awaiting a dispositional
hearing is thirty days, and the time held between disposition and trans-
123. Id
124. Ia at 538.
125. Ia at 537.
126. Id
127. Ia
128. l at 536.
129. Id.
[Vol. 95:505528
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fer to the appropriate placement facility is fourteen days. 130 Should
overcrowding occur despite these measures, the lower courts must
develop alternatives to detention such as in-home detention, electronic
monitoring, and emergency shelters.1 3 ' Additionally, to ensure com-
pliance with the new safeguards, the Facilities Review court initiated a
reporting system whereby the status at each facility will be monitored
by the DHHR and the Facilities Review Panel on a monthly basis.
132
VI. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
FACILITIES REVIEW DEcIsIoN
Facilities Review is worthy of note for its progressive approach to
combating injustices and abuses, both real and potential, in the juvenile
court process. The court's decision in Facilities Review comports with
the language of Chapter 49 of the West Virginia Code and the court's
earlier opinion in Kinder. The court reiterates its commitment to the
children of West Virginia, and reaffirms the legislative and judicial
preference for release rather than detention. Moreover, the court's
decision strikes an acceptable balance between the welfare of accused
juveniles and the safety of the community, yet provides a workable
solution to the problems of overuse and inconsistency in the detention
process.
The most salient aspect of the court's decision in Facilities Review
is the establishment of statewide objective standards upon which the
decision to detain must be predicated. Although initially unwilling to
revise the existing criteria without further substantiation of the
petitioners' allegations,13 the court ultimately concluded that the use
of such standards would "discourage the vague and often subjective
method of deciding whether to detain a juvenile."'4 Accordingly,
with agreement of the petitioners and the intervenor, the court articu-
lated very specific, narrowly defined criteria upon which the detention
130. l
131. Id
132. Id
133. See supra text accompanying note 57.
134. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532, 536 (W. Va. 1992).
1992-93]
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decision must now be based. 135 Although similar to those recom-
mended by the IJA/ABA, the standards as adopted are "modified to fit
the specialized needs of our juvenile system." 136 These criteria con-
strain but do not abolish the use of detention. Specifically, they ensure
release except in the most compelling circumstances, with the decision
based on measurable and demonstrable determinants, while preserving
the option to detain those who pose the greatest threat to the commu-
nity.
A second important aspect of the Facilities Review decision is the
adoption of realistic protective measures to ameliorate the overcrowd-
ing problem in some facilities. In light of the potential dangers accom-
panying overcrowding and the demonstrated prevalence of this situation
in Wood County, the court's decision is commendable. The major
focus of the measures set forth by the court is prevention of over-
crowding. This is to be accomplished by requiring pre-commitment
actions by the arresting or judicial officer to ascertain the availability
of space for a child before attempting to place a child in a facili-
ty.137 The Facilities Review court also extended to facility personnel
the authority to refuse commitments beyond their licensed capaci-
ty.SB Furthermore, the court set specific limits on the amount of
time a juvenile may now be held in detention between adjudication,
disposition, and placement, factors which were noticeably absent in the
statutory provisions. These time constraints, along with those previous-
ly set forth in the code, should force the courts to act expeditiously to
adjudicate and dispose of cases. 139 Additionally, the court established
a mechanism for reporting and monitoring compliance with the newly
adopted standards and procedural measures, a process that was mark-
edly wanting under the prior law."
The Facilities Review court also noted the roles of the courts and
the legislature in the resolution of this problem. The legislature is
135. Id at 537 app. A.
136. Id at 536.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id
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26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/9
JUVENILE DETENTION
urged to appropriate funds necessary to upgrade or build new facilities
and to provide improved services within the facilities.141 Furthermore,
should overcrowding occur despite these measures, the Facilities Re-
view decision mandates development of alternative methods of deten-
tion, such as in-home detention, electronic monitoring, and emergency
shelters. 2 However, this approach seems somewhat inconsistent with
the court's previously stated goals of preventing detention and over-
crowding, since both detentions and overcrowding must occur before
alternatives are required. In an earlier case, State ex rel. Harris v.
Calendine,14 3 the court held that a juvenile adjudicated guilty was en-
titled to the least restrictive alternative consistent with his or her reha-
bilitative needs. Although Harris dealt with post-dispositional place-
ment, it shows the court's reluctance to lock up children, and it should
be more compelling to avoid such incarceration before a finding of
guilt when a presumption of innocence should prevail. In Harris, the
court stated that in evaluating alternatives to secure confinement, those
involved must look beyond what is available "to what facilities could
reasonably be made available in an enlightened and humane state so-
licitous of the welfare of its children. '' 144 Requiring the development
and utilization of detention alternatives at the outset would seem more
consonant with the court's reasoning in Harris and the philosophy in
Facilities Review that "the welfare of our children is a high priority in
our State." 45
Lastly, the court emphasized the role of the DHHR in managing
the detention facilities. The court stressed that "[p]roper management
of the facilities is an essential element of the solution,"' and stated
that "[t]he Department's statutory obligations ... may not be trans-
ferred to the judicial and legislative branches of government."147
Moreover, the court charged the DHHR "to aggressively seek the
141. Id'
142. Id
143. 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977).
144. Id. at 331.
145. Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532, 536 (W. Va. 1992).
146. Id
147. Id
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funding from the Legislature necessary to fulfill those responsibili-
ties."4
The potential implications of the Facilities Review decision are
worthy of comment. The court's adoption of definitive standards
should eliminate the discretionary nature of the detention decision pro-
cess and the concomitant disparity in results among counties. By ap-
plying these criteria, the number of detained youths should be reduced
and those inappropriately detained for vague or unsubstantiated reasons
eliminated. At the same time, public safety and court integrity should
not be jeopardized. With the procedural measures in place, overcrowd-
ing and its attendant dangers should be avoided. The reduction in the
number of juveniles detained should result in diminished costs overall,
even though the state may have to expend funds to develop and imple-
ment alternatives. Furthermore, the decision increases the accountability
of judges hearing juvenile cases and should result in more expeditious
processing of juvenile cases. In light of the court's decision in Facili-
ties Review, it behooves judges and lawyers to be aware of the new
standards to avoid inappropriate detention and to advocate for release.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Facilities Review decision is noteworthy for several rea-
sons. Most importantly, it provides clear and narrowly drawn standards
upon which judges must base their decision to detain or release the
accused juvenile. The factors to be evaluated are readily measurable
and verifiable, and limit, but do not abolish, detention. However, the
standards eliminate the overbroad judicial discretion embodied in the
prior law which should result in a more uniform and consistent
decision-making process statewide. Thus, application of these standards
should effectively reduce the number of youths detained overall, and
particularly the number held for vague or inappropriate reasons such as
those detained out of unsubstantiated fear for public safety. At the
same time, courts may detain those who pose a real threat to the com-
munity or the judicial process . Secondly, implementation of the proce-
dural protective measures established by the court, and the use of the
148. Id
[Vol. 95:505
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least restrictive alternative to detention, should ameliorate the problem
of overcrowding of facilities. Additionally, the court's decision should
bring about a reduction in the costs of detention borne by the taxpay-
ers of the state.
The Facilities Review decision is sound. When one considers the
interests to be protected-those of the society versus those of the
accused child-it is clear that the court has struck an acceptable bal-
ance between the public's demand for safety and the welfare of the
child. The opinion demonstrates the court's commitment to the welfare
of the children of West Virginia, and charges all participants in the
process with the duty to work concertedly and diligently to ensure that
this commitment is upheld. In redefining the governing standards for
determining the appropriateness of detention and adopting measures to
prevent overcrowding of facilities, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has taken a progressive step toward ensuring a more humane
and benevolent treatment of accused youths in West Virginia.
Elizabeth S. Lawton
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